shieldrefugeeinitiative.org

According to its WHOIS record, SHIELDREFUGEEINITIATIVE.ORG was created on October 16, 2024 and expires on October 16, 2025. That makes the domain about 2 years old. It is registered through PDR Ltd. d/b/a PublicDomainRegistry.com (IANA ID 303) and is past its expiry date. The registrant is listed in Uganda. Status flags such as transfer or delete locks are set by the registrar or registry to protect a domain from unauthorised changes. An older registration date is often seen as a sign of an established website, although age alone says nothing about who owns it today. Privacy services replace the owner's contact details in the public record with those of a proxy, which is common for personal registrations. Nameservers decide where a domain's DNS is hosted, so a change of nameservers usually means the website or email moved to a new provider. Renewals are usually made for one to ten years at a time, so an expiry date far in the future shows a long-term commitment to the name. Managed DNS providers are often used for speed, security and protection against attacks. The creation date shows when the name was first registered, while the expiry date shows how long the current registration has been paid for. Domains that are not renewed before their expiry date normally enter a grace and redemption period before they can be registered again. When a domain uses its own nameservers, the owner runs the DNS directly instead of relying on a hosting or DNS provider. A registrar transfer moves the management of a domain from one company to another without changing the domain name itself. Changes to the registrant organisation can point to a sale, a merger or simply an update of company details.

Whois Data Center holds one WHOIS snapshot for SHIELDREFUGEEINITIATIVE.ORG, captured on October 17, 2024. Buyers often review the history of a domain before purchasing it, to see past owners and registrars. Each snapshot is a dated copy of the public WHOIS record as it looked when it was collected. Investigators use dated records to establish who controlled a domain at a specific point in time. A long history with few changes usually points to a stable owner, while frequent changes can signal a transfer or a resale. Snapshots are collected over time, so the gaps between them depend on how often the record was checked. Comparing snapshots makes it easy to see when the registrar, nameservers or status of a domain changed. The snapshot list below shows every capture we hold, newest first. Security teams use WHOIS history to spot suspicious ownership changes and to link related domains. Each change listed here can be checked against the original snapshots further down the page.